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The Murky Waters of International
Environmental Jurisprudence: A
Critique of Recent WTO Holdings in
the Shrimp/Turtle Controversy
Bret Puls
INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of the shrimp fishing industry over the
past several decades has gradually whittled away sea turtle
populations. The worldwide focus on the freedom of the global
market and the facilitation of international trade has enabled
this decline in sea turtle populations to go relatively unchecked.
A United States regulation requiring foreign countries to use
simple, inexpensive shrimp harvesting nets that afford sea turtles an escape route to safety stands at the forefront of the increasing friction between environment and trade. World Trade
Organization ("WTO") Dispute Resolution Panels and the WTO
Appellate Body, however, have consistently held such environmental measures invalid under international law. 1
On April 6, 1998, a Dispute Resolution Panel of the WTO
dealt another blow to United States efforts to address pressing2
international environmental issues through trade sanctions.
The Panel invalidated a United States ban on imports of shrimp
and shrimp products 3 from countries that did not require the
use of certain Turtle Exclusion Devices ("TEDs") on shrimp har1. The Shrimp/Turtle ruling is the latest of several international trade
disputes involving American environmental legislation. See Richard J. McLaughlin, Settling Trade-Related Disputes over the Protection of Marine Living
Resources: UNCLOS or the WTO, 10 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 29-31 (1997).
The Tuna/Dolphin I and II decisions held that the United States violated

GATT by placing embargoes on tuna and tuna products from countries failing
to meet certain standards of dolphin protection. See id. at 29-30.
2. See World Trade Organization Dispute Panel Report, United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 33 I.L.M. 832
(1998) [hereinafter Panel Report].
3. See Pub. L. No. 101-162, Endangered Species Act § 609 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1537) (1998) [hereinafter Section 6091.
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vesting vessels. 4 On July 13, 1998, the United States notified
the WTO of its decision to appeal certain issues of the Panel Report and filed a notice of appeal with the WTO's Appellate
Body.5 On October 12, 1998, the Appellate Body upheld the
Panel decision, but on different grounds. 6 The ruling overturned
several key findings of the Panel and concluded that the United
States had a right under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and WTO rules to adopt its restrictions. 7 The
American restrictions failed, however, under general provisions
of the GATT because the ban constituted "arbitrary" and "unjustifiable" discrimination in its application to members of the
8
WTO.

The Appellate Body Report revisited issues presented in
several previous WTO holdings. The Appellate Body analyzed,
among other things, whether the United States conservation
measures violated GATT regardless of their beneficial goals and
whether such measures were justified under GATT Article XX. 9
The decisions by the Panel and Appellate Body require the
United States either to ignore the binding dispute resolution
power of the WTO 10 or abandon a program protecting the endangered sea turtle and other species." The dispute has broader
ramifications: the WTO, again faced with the trade-environment conflict that has plagued it over the past decade, may have
effectively crippled the United States' ability to protect the envi4. Shrimp harvesting vessels are trawling boats, 25 feet or longer, that
operate in offshore waters with large nets designed to ensnare shrimp as the
nets are pulled into the boats. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE TED EXPERIENCE: CLAIMS AND REALITY (Apr. 1992)
[hereinafter NMFS Report].
5. United States Notice of Appeal, WT/DS58/11 (July 13, 1998).
6. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United
States-ImportProhibitionof CertainShrimp and Shrimp Products,WTIDS58/
AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report].
7. See Panel Report, supra note 2, at para. 7.25.
8. See id.
9. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 6; see infra Section II (discussing Article XX (b) and (g)).
10. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex II, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter WTO Final Act].
The World Trade Organization was formally established on January 1, 1995.
An important aspect of WTO ruling on the Shrimp/ Turtle dispute is that, as
opposed to previous rulings denouncing similar United States trade sanctions,
the WTO has binding adjudicative power.
11. See Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Environmental Law; Sea
Turtles and World Trade, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 24, 1998, at 3.
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ronment on a global level. 12 Meanwhile, the sea turtle and other
endangered species continue to diminish in number as these
trade issues are debated.
This Note analyzes the application of international trade
law by the WTO Dispute Panel and WTO Appellate Body to unilateral environmental regulations designed to protect endangered sea turtles. Part I surveys the history of the Shrimp /
Turtle dispute. Part II sets forth the reasoning and holdings of
the Dispute Panel and Appellate Body. Part III analyzes these
holdings and questions whether the WTO can effectively act as a
neutral decision-maker in environment-trade disputes. This
Note concludes that although unilateral environmental regulations may not be completely consistent with the need for open,
even-handed international trade, the WTO Dispute Panel and
Appellate Body have unconvincingly disparaged the text of
GATT Article XX in order to maintain a strong, predetermined,
and unnecessary position against unilateral environmental
trade measures.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

THE PLIGHT OF THE SEA TURTLE

Over the past two decades, the worldwide market for
shrimp has grown exponentially. In 1993, the total harvest from
wild fisheries and from shrimp farms was fifty-six percent
greater than the 1982 harvest. 13 Commercial shrimping is also
among the most devastating threats to marine wildlife, having
one of the highest rates of bycatch 14 of any fishing industry. On
average, a single shrimp fishing expedition kills over five kilograms of other marine wildlife for every one kilogram of shrimp
harvested. 15

12. See Trade: WTO Upholds Ruling that U.S. Restrictions Linked to Sea
Turtles Violate Trade Rules, INT'L ENv. DAILY (BNA) available in Westlaw
Database BNA-IED (Oct. 16, 1998).
13. See A. Charlotte de Fontaubert et al., Biodiversity in the Seas: Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity in Marine and Coastal Habitats,
10 GEO. INT'L L. REv. 753, 796 (1998).
14. See generally NMFS Report, supra note 4 (defining "bycatch" as the accidental capture of other organisms).
15. See de Fontaubert, supra note 13, at 797 (noting that some shrimp fisheries "have recorded bycatch ratios of fifteen to one").
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Sea turtles are especially vulnerable. 16 Scientific research
over the past twenty years reveals that commercial shrimping
significantly threatens the survival of sea turtles.' 7 A statement
signed by more than 160 scientists from twenty-four countries
asserted that five species of sea turtles are in immediate danger
of extinction and that commercial shrimping causes as many as

150,000 turtle deaths annually from drowning while entangled
in shrimp fishing nets.' 8
To stave off the imminent extinction of these sea turtles, the

United States proposed the use of Turtle Exclusion Devices
("TEDs"). These underwater "doggie doors" enable trapped turtles to escape from shrimp nets and avoid certain death. 19
Before the United States implemented and enforced the TED re-

quirement against its own fishing vessels, 55,000 sea turtles
drowned annually from the United States shrimping industry
alone. 20 TEDs, costing between $50 and $400, provide "a simple, inexpensive solution" that may reduce such turtle casualties
2
by at least ninety-seven percent. '

B.

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SHRIMP EMBARGO

Concern about the high turtle death rate led the United
States to implement a voluntary domestic program to test the
16. See generally NMFS Report, supra note 4 (noting that the NMFS estimated that 47,973 turtles were captured annually in commercial shrimp trawls,
and that over 11,000 of those died).
17. See EndangeredSpecies: Asian Nations Move to Nullify U.S. Law Requiring Device to Protect Sea Turtles, INT'L ENv. DAILY (BNA) available in
Westlaw Database BNA-IED (June 19, 1997).
18. See id.
19. See Paul S. Kibel, Justice for the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservationand
the Court of InternationalTrade, 15 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.& POL'Y 57, 61 (1996-97)
(citing Jane Kay, Rare Turtles Fiqure in Trade Pact, SAN FRANciso EXAMINER,
Sept. 18, 1993, at A4). A TED is a cage-like structure fitting in the neck of a
shrimp net that prevents turtles and larger fish from being caught. Since the
turtle cannot pass through the cage, the turtle is forced upward through an
escape hatch. See Margaret D. Tutwiler, Sea Turtle Conservation in Commerical Fisheries. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 2 (May 6, 1991), at 338.
20. See MICHAEL WEBER ET AL., DELAY AND DENIAL; A POLITICAL HISTORY
OF SEA TURTLES AND SHRIMP FISHING 12 (1995); The Futility, Utility and Future
of the Biodiversity Convention, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 34 n.187
(1998).
21. EndangeredSpecies: Asian Nations Move to Nullify U.S. Law Requiring Device to Protect Sea Turtles, supra note 17 (quoting James Spotila, director
of the Center for Biodiversity and Conservation at Drexel University); Environmentalists Win CIT Decision That Could Yield Shrimp Import Bans, INT'L
ENV'T DAILY (BNA), available in Westlaw database BNA-IED (Jan. 17, 1996).
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effectiveness of TEDs. 22 The United States National Marine
Fisheries Service built and delivered TEDs to United States
fishermen volunteering for the program. 23 Although the program succeeded in reducing turtle kills, the Fisheries Service
determined that significant numbers of fishermen, fearing the
loss of shrimp through the devices, would not voluntarily adopt
the use of TEDs. The United States then issued regulations,
pursuant to the Endangered Species Act of 1973,24 requiring the
use of TEDs by American commercial shrimp vessels in specified
25
areas.
Two years later, the United States enacted The 1989 Sea
Turtle Conservation Amendments to the Endangered Species
Act, with Section 609 of the statute establishing the TED regulations for imports. 26 Section 609 banned imports of shrimp and
shrimp products harvested through commercial fishing methods
that harm sea turtles. 27 Specifically, it targeted shrimp and
shrimp products from countries that failed to receive certification by the United States under the regulations. 28 Section
609(a) required the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations
with all foreign countries to develop treaties protecting sea turtles and to report such negotiations to Congress. 2 9 Section
609(b) required the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Treasury to prohibit shrimp products from entering the United States
if the exporting country failed to mandate use of shrimp nets
30
equipped with TEDs.
Section 609 provided two alternative types of annual certifi31
cation through which a nation could avoid the import ban.
22. See NMFS Report, supra note 4; Marlo Pfister Cadeddu, Note, Turtles
in the Soup?, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 184 (1998).
23. See NMFS Report, supra note 4.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et. seq. (1975).
25. See 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Regulations]. Five
species of sea turtles fell under the regulations: loggerhead (Caretta caretta),
Kemp's ridley (Lepidochelys kempi), green (Chelonia mydas), leatherback
(Dermochelys coriacea) and hawksbill (Eretmochelys imbricata). The 1987 Regulations, prior to taking full effect in 1990, were modified so as to mandate the
use of approved TEDs in areas where shrimp trawling would interact with sea
turtles.
26. See Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 1037 (1989) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1537 note (Supp. IV 1992)).
27. See id.
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 1537 note ("certification" under the Turtle Conservation
Amendments means that a country will be allowed to continue to export shrimp
to the United States).
29. See § 609(a), supra note 3.
30. See § 609(b), supra note 3.
31. See 61 Fed. Reg. 17,342 (1996).
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First, the United States would grant certification to countries
with fishing environments that posed no threat of the incidental
taking of sea turtles in the course of shrimp harvesting. 3 2 Second, the United States would certify harvesting nations that
provided evidence of regulatory programs similar to those of the
United States. 3 3 Absent such certification, the regulations required the United States to block the importation of shrimp and
shrimp products from any non-compliant country.
The State Department elaborated the certification requirements in a series of guidelines promulgated in 1991, 1993, and
1996. 3 4 The 1991 guidelines narrowed the scope of Section 609

geographically to certain countries in the Caribbean/Western
Atlantic region. 3 5 Potential administrative and economic consequences, however, delayed implementation of the law. 3 6 Con-

gress realized that federal agencies would need time to develop
37
specific guidelines and plans for regulatory enforcement.
Then, in 1993, the United States eliminated the Section 609 alternative certification option and required that by May of 1994
the listed countries 38 must commit themselves to 100 percent
TED usage. 39 After such a commitment and the requisite Section 609(b) certification, shrimp and shrimp products could
enter the United States regardless of method of harvest.
Two years later, in 1995, the United States Court of International Trade (CIT) found the guidelines limiting the scope of
the law contrary to Section 609. It ordered the U.S. government
to "prohibit the importation of shrimp or products of shrimp
wherever harvested in the wild with commercial fishing technology which may affect adversely those species of sea turtles the
conservation of which is the subject of regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of Commerce."4 0 Under this ruling, the CIT
32. See § 609(b)(2)(C), supra note 3.
33. See § 609(b)(2)(A) and (B), supra note 3.
34. 56 Fed. Reg. 1,051 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Guidelines]; 58 Fed. Reg.
9,015 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Guidelines]; and 61 Fed. Reg. 17,342 (1996)
[hereinafter 1996 Guidelines], respectively.
35. See 1991 Guidelines, supra note 34, at 1,051. Specifically, the 1991
Guidelines named Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Suriname,
French Guinea, and Brazil.
36. See Kibel, supra note 19, at 63.
37. See id.
38. See 1993 Guidelines, supra note 34, at 9,015. The 1993 Guidelines applied to the countries listed in the 1991 Guidelines.
39. See id.
40. Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 579 (Ct. Int'l.
Trade 1995) ["Earth Island I"]. The CIT refused a subsequent request by the
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permitted affected nations four months to comply without im41
posing trade sanctions.
In April 1996, Congress again revised the guidelines and extended Section 609 to shrimp harvested under the jurisdiction of
all foreign nations. 4 2 In implementing Section 609(a), the guidelines assert that the import prohibitions contained Section 609
do not apply to shrimp or shrimp products harvested using sea
turtle-safe methods. 4 3 The 1996 Guidelines further provide that
the State Department may certify: (1) any harvesting nation
without any of the relevant species of sea turtles living in waters
subject to its jurisdiction; (2) any harvesting nation that harvests shrimp exclusively by means that do not pose a threat to
sea turtles;4 4 and (3) any nation whose commercial shrimp
trawling operations take place exclusively in waters subject to
its jurisdiction in which sea turtles cannot be found at any
45
time.
The 1996 Guidelines also instruct the State Department,
under Section 609(b), to assess the regulatory program of the
shrimp-harvesting nation. The Department should provide certification if the program requires the use of TEDs that are "comparable in effectiveness to those used in the United States and if
it contains "a credible enforcement effort that includes monitoring for compliance and appropriate sanctions."4 6 The United
States considered the average incidental bycatch "comparable if
the harvesting nation requires the use of TEDs in a manner
comparable to that of the U.S. program."4 7
The economic reasoning and policy objectives behind Section 609 were simple. Because the United States is a large importer of shrimp and shrimp products, foreign nations have a
material interest in preserving their access to this market. Conditioning access on compliance with environmental regulations
would thus effectuate those regulations. 48 Moreover, Section
609 would create an even international playing field for U.S.
Department of State to postpone the May 1, 1996 deadline. See Earth Island
Inst. v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 1995) [Earth Island II].
41. See Earth Island I, supra note 40.
42. See 1996 Guidelines, supra note 34, at 17,343.
43. See id.
44. For example, artisanal shrimping does not pose a threat to sea turtles.
45. See id.

46. Id. at 17,344. Note that any exceptions to the TED requirement "must

be comparable to those [TEDs] of the United States program." Id.
47. Id.
48. See Kibel, supra note 19, at 63.
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were already required to use TEDs under dofishermen, who
49
mestic law.
C.

THE

GATT/WTO

AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE MEASURES

An environmental trade measure is "a restriction on international trade with the announced purpose of promoting an environmental objective." 50 There are essentially two types of
51
international trade measures: multilateral and unilateral.
The distinction is important because GATT and WTO policies
and decisions favor multilateral agreements over unilateral
trade measures.5 2 Trade measures also fall into two classes of
application. They may either be applied within the territory of
them, or they may be applied
the country adopting
53
extraterritorially.
The absence of an international judicial system that provides a comprehensive, neutral dispute resolution body able to
cover conflicts such as the Shrimp/ Turtle dispute has led to conflict and divergent policies within the international community. 54 Without a fully evolved international judicial system,
49. See id. (citing Giant Legal Victory for Sea Turtles! Viva La Tortuga
(Sea Turtle Restoration Project, San Francisco, Cal.), 1996, Issue No. 1, at 1,
which reports that United States shrimp fishermen applauded the decision for
"level[ing] the playing field" in the international shrimp market).
50. Steve Charnovitz, A Taxonomy of Environmental Trade Measures, 6
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993).
51. See Mark Foster, Trade and Environment: Making Room for Environmental Trade Measures Within GATT, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 393, 410 (1998). Multilateral agreements are typically characterized as mutually agreed upon
actions adopted by two or more countries. See id. at 413. Unilateral measures,
however, are measures taken pursuant to one country's specific environmental
policies, subjecting other countries to the policies and/or sanctions for failure to
enforce or abide by them. See id.
52. See id. at 410. Foster argues that even though there is a distinction
between the negotiation of multilateral and unilateral trade measures, enforcement of either is essentially the same because each constitutes an unsolicited
infringement upon another state's trade rights. Id. at 412-13. Foster further
argues that unilateral environmental trade measures are often crucial in
changing international environmental norms and are an important catalyst for
protecting the environment. Id. at 414-15. Foster focuses on the utility and
legality of unilateral environmental trade measures, concluding that the GATT/
WTO regime must allow both multilateral and unilateral trade measures under
Article XX in order to maintain its legitimacy. Id. at 443.
53. See id. at 413.
54. See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on
Domestic Environmental Regulations, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 59
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996); Andrew L. Strauss, From
Gattzilla to the Green Giant: Winning the EnvironmentalBattle for the Soul of
the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 769, 776-77 (1998).
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environmental measures disputed for their effect on trade must
come before a WTO Dispute Panel and, if the Panel's decision is
appealed, the Appellate Body. 55 The GATT/WTO regime, however, lacks a coherent framework for assessing the trade effects
of environmental measures. Dispute Panels and the Appellate
Body consist mostly of experts focused on advocating free
trade. 56 The WTO consistently favors the use of multilateral environmental trade measures over unilateral measures with the
same goals without explicitly ruling that extraterritorial unilateral environmental trade measures are per se invalid.
Past decisions handed down by the GATT/WTO regime provide an important backdrop to the recent rulings in the Shrimp /
Turtle case. These decisions analyzed trade measures imposed
by the United States under Articles I, III, XI, XIII and XX of
GATT. 57 In Tuna/Dolphin i,58 a GATT Dispute Resolution
Panel reviewed a United States embargo banning tuna imports
from Mexico that did not comply with dolphin-protective provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).5 9 The
GATT Panel invalidated the MMPA under Article 11160 because
the MMPA contained an import restriction based on the process
by which a product is manufactured instead of a direct regulation on the product as a product. 6 1 The Panel stated that "these
regulations could not be regarded as being applied to tuna prodStrauss notes that there are alternate forums for achieving agreements, including the United Nations Conference on Environmental Development (Rio Conference), the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development. Id. at 819-20. Strauss argues, however, that many of these alternate forums and multilateral agreements are unfit for producing meaningful agreements or standards in a timely manner. Id.
They also suffer because they have no binding adjudicative power. See id. Currently, the WTO appears to be the most effective, if not the only, dispute resolution mechanism available to handle environment-trade disputes.
55. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 54.
56. See id.
57. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
58. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States Restrictions on Imports
of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. ( 3 9 th Supp.), 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/
Dolphin I].
59. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
60. Article 111(4) provides the following:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
GATT, supra note 57, at art. III:4.
61. See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 58, IT 5.13, 5.14.
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ucts as such because they would not directly regulate the sale of
tuna and could not possibly affect the tuna as a product." 62 The
Panel, making the "process-product" distinction, took all Article
III defenses away from the United States. Moreover, because
the United States did not dispute Mexico's Article X16 3 claim
quantitative restriction, the
that the embargo was a prohibited
64
favor.
Mexico's
in
ruled
Panel
The United States argued that the MMPA regulation, even
if not allowable under Article III, was justified under the exceptions detailed in Article XX.65 The GATT Panel disagreed, fo66
cusing on the extraterritorial scope of the regulation.
Essentially, the Panel rejected the application of Article XX(b)
and (g), finding that the exceptions do not apply to actions
outside the jurisdictional borders of the member enacting the
measure. 6 7 The Panel also held that the ban did not meet the
requirements of Article XX(b)'s "necessary to protect" clause because the United States had other international methods to negotiate an agreement-even though the United States had
attempted several times to negotiate multilateral agreements. 68
With respect to Article XX(g), the Panel failed to find the re62. Id. 5.14.
63. Article XI of GATT states the following:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT,supra note 57, at art. XI:I.
5.13, 5.14. 5.18, 5.36.
64. See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 58,
65. Article XX embodies the "General Exceptions" provisions of the GATT.
The pertinent language of Article XX is:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; [or]
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
GATT, supra note 57, at art. XX. Subsections (b) and (g) are two of the "general
exceptions" listed by Article XX as immune from GATT Articles prohibiting restrictions on trade. See id.
66. See id.
5.26-5.27, 5.31-5.32.
67. See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 58,
68. See Steve Charnovitz, Dolphins and Tuna: An Analysis of the Second
GATT Panel Report, 24 ENV'r'L. L. REP. 10,567, 10,570 (1994).
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quired relationship between the embargo and the conservation
of an exhaustible natural resource. 6 9 The Panel did not think
that the regulation, which imposed restrictions based on the actual taking rate of United States fishermen, made the MMPA
either "necessary" (Article XX(b)) or "primarily aimed" at conservation (Article XX(g)). 70 The Panel held that the United States
could have used less arbitrary methods to achieve the same
71
goals.
After Mexico chose to negotiate an agreement with the
United States rather than pursue the formal adoption of the
Panel's findings,7 2 the European Union and the Netherlands
again challenged the MMPA. 7 3 In Tuna/Dolphin H, the Panel
focused significantly more on the Article XX exceptions than it
did in Tuna/Dolphin IJ.74 Departing from the previous ruling,
the Panel deemed dolphins an "exhaustible natural resource" for
purposes of the Article XX(g) exception.7 5 Moreover, the Panel
rejected the notion that measures under Article XX(g) could not
be applied extraterritorially. 7 6 The Panel reasoned, however,
that GATT members may not implement extraterritorial measures that force other GATT members to enact measures governing activities "within their own jurisdiction."7 7 In other
words, under Tuna/Dolphin H, a country may assert Article XX
exceptions to support the protection of resources occurring
outside its borders, but it cannot affirmatively require another
country to adopt and implement specified policies and regulations. 78 Although permitting extraterritorial measures, the
Panel would not justify the MMPA's intrusive requirements
69. See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 58, 5.28.
70. Id. IT 5.28, 5.33.
71. See id.
72. See Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the United
States' Use of Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and
Other InternationalMarine Living Resources, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 12 (1994).
Prior to adoption of the WTO, for a GATT Panel finding to be binding on the
countries in dispute, it must have been officially adopted by all the involved
parties. See e.g., GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States-Section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) 5.26 (1990).
73. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States-Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II].
74. See id. The Panel concluded that the United States violated Article XI
and that Article III was inapplicable, following the precedent of the Tuna/
Dolphin I.
75. Id. 5.13.
76. See id. 5.15.
77. Id. 5.15-5.20.
78. See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 73, I 5.23-5.32. Similarly, the Panel
analyzed the embargo under Article XX(b), determining that the extrajudicial
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under the "necessary/related" clauses of Article XX (b) and (g).
It should be noted, however, that neither Tuna/Dolphin I nor
Tuna/DolphinII constitutes binding precedent on the WTO, because neither was formally adopted by the GATT contracting
79
parties.
In 1996, the WTO Appellate Body took a different path to
defeat a United States environmental trade measure. U. S. Gasoline8 0 involved provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 that required changes in the composition of gasoline sold to
consumers. 8 ' Instead of focusing on the language of Article
XX(b) and (g), the Appellate Body turned its attention to Article
XX's chapeau for guidance.8 2 It reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
Member of measures [meeting the requirements of the any of the exceptions listed (a) through (j)].83

The Appellate Body in U.S. Gasoline found that the Clean
Air Act Amendments met the Article XX(g) requirements and
reversed the Panel on two grounds. First, the Panel erred when
it concluded that "'the less favourable baseline establishments
[sic] methods' were not primarily aimed at the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources" for purposes of Article XX(g)
analysis.8 4 According to the Appellate Body, the correct question to ask was whether the measure itself was related to the
conservation of natural resources, not the "less favourable treatment." The Appellate Body found that the Gasoline rules did
indeed "relat[e] to" conservation of a resource.8 5 The Panel also
erred by misinterpreting Article XX(g) to mean that the measure
nature of the measure was allowable, but forcing other countries to follow was
not justified under the "necessary" requirement. See id.
5.34-5.39.
79. See Howard F. Chang, Carrots, Sticks, and InternationalExternalities,
17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 309,311 (1997); DANIEL C. EsTy, GREENING THE GATT:
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND Tim FUTURE 268-69 (1994).
80. World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report, United StatesStandards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996)
[hereinafter U.S. Gasoline].
81. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, InternationalTrade and Protectionof the
Environment: The ContinuingSearch for Reconciliation,91 Am. J. INT'L L. 268,
274 (1997).
82. See id. at 274-75.
83. Id.
84. U.S. Gasoline, supra note 80, at 620.
85. Id.
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must be "necessary or essential."8 6 The Appellate Body reversed, stating that the Panel had "overlooked a fundamental
rule of treaty interpretation"-namely, that a treaty should be
interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning in the light
8 7
of its object and purpose.
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body held that, under the chapeau, the United States measure constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and was a "disguised restriction on international
trade."8 8 The Appellate Body thus opened the Article XX(b) and
(g) doors to environmental trade measures only to slam them
shut with its restrictive interpretation of the chapeau.8 9 In analyzing the chapeau, the Appellate Body added teeth to a provision in GATT that had seen little attention. The Appellate Body
noted that the purpose and object of the chapeau, whose conditions must be met in order to invoke the exceptions following it,
was to avoid the abuse and illegitimate use of Article XX. 90 The
Appellate Body reasoned that the United States' failure to meet
the requirements of the chapeau barred it from invoking Article
XX's exceptions. Therefore the Clean Air Act Amendments were
invalid.9 1
In summary, the Tuna/Dolphin I case held that extraterritorial enforcement of any regulation is contrary to GATT policies. In Tuna/Dolphin II, the WTO reopened the possibility
that countries may enforce environmental regulations abroad,
but only if they do not infringe the sovereignty of other member
countries. While the decision in U.S. Gasoline allowed environmental trade measures to fit within the Article XX exceptions,
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 620-22 (citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,

opened for signature May 3, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331).
88. U.S. Gasoline, supra note 80, at 633.
89. See Steve Charnovitz, Future Challenges: New Substantive Areas Environment and Health Under WTO Dispute Settlement, 32 INT'L LAw. 901, 91011 (Fall 1998).
90. See U.S. Gasoline, supra note 80, at 626. The Appellate Body stated
that the United States could have met the requirements of the chapeau by applying less arbitrary and discriminatory means. See id. at 626-33. The Appellate Body makes clear that there is a difference between the discrimination that
results in a violation of Article III and the "unjustifiable" discrimination that
constitutes a violation of the chapeau. See id. at 627. If the Article XX and
Article III "discrimination" provisions are interpreted as the same standard-in
other words that a simple discrimination on trade violates the chapeau-then
Article XX would be meaningless. See id. The Appellate Body supported this
conclusion invoking the Vienna Convention Standard of Interpretation, which
requires that a provision is not to be interpreted so as to empty another provision of all meaning. See id.
91.
Id. at 633.
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the WTO looked unfavorably upon the unilateral nature of the
challenged measure. It is against this backdrop that the United
States embargo on shrimp and shrimp products harvested without the use of TEDs came to the WTO Dispute Panel and to the
Appellate Body.
II.

THE DISPUTE-POSITIONS OF THE VARIOUS KEY
ENTITIES IN THE DEBATE

A.

THE CHALLENGING COUNTRIES' POSITION

The Asian delegations asserted that Section 609 was arbitrary and that countries should not impose unilateral measures
affecting trade regardless of the environmental grounds. 92 The
complaints filed before the Dispute Panel alleged that the
United States violated Articles I, 9 3 XI, and XIII, and that these
violations constituted "a nullification and impairment of benefits" granted under GATT. 94 The challengers also contended
that the United States' claim of justification under Article XX
95
was incorrect.
India, Pakistan, and Thailand claimed that Section 609 violated Article 196 because physically identical shrimp from different nations were being treated differently based on the method
of harvest and the policies of the foreign government under
whose jurisdiction the shrimp were harvested. 97 They also argued that, under the certification requirement, shrimp harvested by an uncertified country using the correct harvesting
method would be forbidden from entering the United States,
while shrimp harvested using the same method by a certified
92. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, 35. The delegation included
India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Malaysia. See generally Appellate Body Report,
supra note 6 (describing the Asian delegation).
93. Malaysia did not join in the argument that the United States' provision
violated Article I.
94. First Submission of Thailand, World Trade Organization Panel on
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
available in 1997 WL 304829, at *22 (W.T.O. May 20, 1997).
95. See id.
96. Article I of GATT provides in its pertinent part that:
[W]ith respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation. . . any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 57, at art. 1:1.
97. See id. at *9.
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country would be granted entry. 98 India, Pakistan and Thailand
further contended that the embargo was inconsistent with the
most-favored-nation ("MFN") principle embodied in Article I because the law discriminated between harvesting nations whose
conservation policies differed from those of the United States
and harvesting nations with the same equipment and method of
harvest but with different certification status.9 9
All four challengers cited Article XI, which eliminates quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, including outright
quotas and other restrictions made effective through import or
export licenses. 10 0 The countries argued that the shrimp embargo was "a prohibition or restriction" on importation of shrimp
and shrimp products and that requiring all countries to install
TEDs on shrimp vessels before being allowed to export harvested shrimp constituted an "unreasonable restriction" on
trade. 101
The challengers also claimed that Section 609 violated Article XIIII02 because it allowed the United States to permit or
deny entry to shrimp or shrimp products based on the method of
harvest. 10 3 Because the method of harvest does not affect the
nature of the product's physical characteristics, end use, or tariff
classifications, the embargo provided for differential treatment
of "like products" from certified and uncertified nations, thereby
violating Article XIII.' 0 4 In the alternative, the countries argued that even if the method of harvest affects the nature of the
product, the ban nevertheless violated Article XIII. Countries
yet to receive certification could not export their shrimp to
America even though they were harvesting shrimp with TEDs,
while certified countries using the same methods could. 10 5 Be98. See id.
99. See First Submission of Pakistan, World Trade Organization Panel on
United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
available in 1997 WL 304819 (W.T.O. May 20, 1997), at *4.
100. See Submission of Thailand, supra note 94, at *7.
101. Submission of Pakistan, supra note 99, at *4.
102. Article XIII of GATT requires that:
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party... unless the importation of the like product of all third
countries is similarly prohibited or restricted.
GATT, supra note 57, at art. XIII:1
103. See Submission of Thailand, supra note 94, at *8.
104. Id.
105. See id. at *8-10.
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cause identical products received dissimilar treatment, Section
10 6
609 violated Article XIII.
Finally, the countries disputed the contention that the
shrimp embargo fit under exceptions contained in XX(b) and
XX(g). They contended that the policy underlying the embargo
did not fit within XX(b). The challenging countries reasoned
that the Article XX(b) exception only encompasses measures
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. '1 0 7
Because the Article does not expressly permit a contracting
party to take measures concerning the humans, animals or
plants located within the jurisdiction of another contracting
party, Article XX must not have been intended to allow such
measures. The challenging countries argued that because the
text is silent on exactly where an enacting member may take
measures to protect the environment, the GATT text should be
construed in light of Articles 1.2, 2.1 and 2.7 of the Charter of
United Nations.1 0 8 The U.N. Charter provides for the sovereignty of individual nations and non-interference in the internal
affairs of other nations.' 0 9 The countries asserted the classic rebuttal to an Article XX(b) defense-namely, that Section 609
was not "necessary" to fulfill policy objectives and that it constituted arbitrary and unjustified discrimination between contracting parties, thereby
making it a disguised restriction on
1 10
international trade.
The challenging countries argued that Article XX(g) was inapplicable to Section 609 because the Article XX(g) exception applies only to a finite physical resource located inside the
jurisdiction of the member enacting the measure."' The countries first reasoned that turtles are not a finite resource such as
minerals, and therefore Article XX(g) does not apply to Section
609.112 The challengers further reasoned that, under a strict
reading of the Article XX(g) exception, Section 609 should not
have applied to natural resources located outside the jurisdiction of the contracting party enacting the measure. 1 3 The
countries further relied on the drafting history of GATT Article
XX and rules of interpretation to find the embargo outside the
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id.
Id. at *10.
See id.
See id.
Id. at *13-15.
See Submission of Thailand, supra note 94, at 13-15.
See id. at *17-18.
See id. at *18-19.
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intended scope of the exceptions. 114 The challengers also noted
that the application of Article XX(g) to Section 609 uncovered
several deficiencies in the embargo: first, the United States embargo did not have the requisite policies related to conservation
of natural resources; second, the embargo itself was not sufficiently related to the protection of sea turtles; and third, Section
609 had been applied in an arbitrary and unjustifiable manner
constituting discrimination and a disguised restriction on international trade. 115
All the challengers complained that they had historically
protected sea turtles and that the United States embargo constituted an unwanted intrusion on their sovereign rights. The
challengers thus argued that because they implemented sea turtle conservation measures, there was no need for the United
States to impose its own extraterritorial measures. For example, Thailand argued that its culture "embraces a traditional belief that it is sinful to kill sea turtles."'1 6 Additionally, Thailand
noted that three branches of its government are responsible for
implementing conservation legislation, education, and regulatory programs sufficient to protect the sea turtles indigenous to
the country."- 7 Furthermore, the countries argued that
although conservation is an important goal, it fails to justify unilateral actions that infringe upon the sovereign rights of member countries to set environmental and conservationist policies.
In response to the United States' appeal, the challengers
maintained that the Panel's ruling on the chapeau of Article
XX"1

8

was correct. 1 19 The challenging countries argued that

Section 609 failed to meet the necessary standards because conditioning access to markets for a given product upon the adop120
tion of certain policies violated GATT:
If every WTO Member were free to pursue its own trade policy solu-

tions to what it perceives to be environmental concerns, the multilateral trade system would cease to exist. By preventing the abuse of
Article XX, the chapeau protects against threats to the multilateral
trading system. The prevention of abuse and the prevention of threats
114. See id. The countries challenging the measure argued that the Tuna/

Dolphin H decision was "not instructive because it fails to take this drafting
history into account." Id.

115. See id. at *20-22.
116. Id. at *6.
117. See id.
118. See supra note 65 (setting forth the chapeau of art. XX).
119. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, at 34.

120. See id.

35.
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to the multilateral trading system are therefore inextricably linked to
the object, purpose and goals of Article XX of the GATT 1994.121

B.

THE UNITED STATES' POSITION

United States trade experts and officials alleged several
fundamental legal flaws with the May 1998 Dispute Panel ruling. In particular, the United States claimed that the Panel incorrectly found that Section 609 was outside the scope of Article
XX.122 The United States asserted that Article XX plainly authorizes the use of trade sanctions to support Section 609's requirement of TEDs on commercial fishing nets.
The United States conceded that Section 609 and its implementing regulations constituted "prohibitions and restrictions"
on trade under Article XI of GATT. 123 The United States argued
that Article XX(b) and (g) of GATT justify Section 609's violation
of Article XI. 1 2 4 The United States supported this argument by
claiming that the TED requirement was necessary to protect
animal life and was related to the conservation of an exhaustible
25
natural resource.'
The United States also contended that the Panel erred in its
application of the Article XX chapeau. According to the United
States, in adopting the "threat to the multilateral trading system" analysis, the Panel ignored the ordinary meaning of the
text.' 2 6 The Panel and Appellate Body stated that acting unilaterally and failing to negotiate adequately with other member
countries before enacting the measure constituted a threat to
the multilateral trading system.' 2 7 The United States argued,
however, that nothing in Article XX requires a Member to seek
to negotiate an international agreement instead of or before
adopting unilateral measures. 28 Regardless, the United States
claimed that it did offer to negotiate, but the complainants did
not reply. 12 9 According to the United States, by expanding the
121. Id. 1 10.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. See id 11.
125. See id.
126. Id. 13; accord U.S. Gasoline, supra note 80, at 20 (stating that "the
basic international law rule of treaty interpretation ... that the terms of the
treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning, in context, so as to effectuate its
object and purpose, is applicable here .. ).
127. See Panel Report, supra note 2,
7.45, 7.49-7.55; Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, %1 166-168, 171-173.
128. See Panel Report, supra note 2, T 7.45-7.46.
129. See id.
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ordinary meaning of the text to encompass a broader, more substantive inquiry, the Panel adopted "an entirely new obligation
under Article XX of the GATT 1994."130
The United States further contended that the Panel misapplied the plain and ordinary meaning and context of the term
"unjustifiable discrimination."1 3 1 The United States argued
that by interpreting the chapeau prohibition against "unjustifiable discrimination" to exclude measures which result in "reduced market access" or "discriminatory treatment," the Panel
erased the exceptions set forth in Article XX. 1 3 2 In support of
this assertion, the United States turned to U.S. Gasoline. 3 3 By
engaging in hypothetical speculation regarding the effects of
other measures in differing circumstances while ignoring the
circumstances of the case at hand, the Panel violated the Appellate Body's instructions in U.S. Gasoline that Article XX must be
applied on a "case-by-case" basis with careful attention paid to
the particular facts of the case at hand.13 4 According to the
United States, in the case at hand U.S. Gasoline required the
conclusion that Section 609 did not constitute "unjustifiable
35
discrimination."'
The United States asserted that the proper inquiry under
the Article XX chapeau is whether the action by the member has
a non-protectionist rationale, such as a rationale based on the
policy goals of Article XX(b) and (g).13 6 The United States argued that Section 609, either on its face or as applied, did not
threaten the multilateral trading system under this interpretation.' 37 The United States further argued that Section 609 differentiated between countries on the basis of risk posed to the
endangered species sought to be protected. The measure did
not treat differently those countries whose shrimp trawling industries posed similar risks to sea turtles, nor did it treat differently United States and foreign shrimp fisherman. 138 The
United States concluded that because Section 609 did not unjustifiably discriminate between similarly situated members, it satisfied the Article XX chapeau. Therefore the Panel should have
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Appellate Body Report, supra note 6,
Id.
11.
Id. [ 15.
See id.
19.
Id.
Id.
22.
See id.
15.
See id. IT 19-21.
See id. 21.

13.
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allowed the analysis to proceed to the exceptions contained
within Article XX.
Turning to those exceptions, the United States claimed that
Section 609 met every element required under Article XX(g).
First, sea turtles were an important, exhaustible natural resource found in the challenging countries' waters and facing the
threat of extinction. Second, Section 609 was substantially related to the conservation of those turtles. 139 Alternatively, the
United States contended that the Panel should have found Section 609 "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
0
health" within the meaning of Article XX(b).14
Finally, the United States argued that the Panel inappropriately applied the object and purpose of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.1 4 1 The United States
claimed that the Panel committed legal error by holding that,
under GATT 1994, trade concerns must prevail over all other
concerns arising under GATT rules.14 2 While the first clause of
the preamble to the WTO Agreement calls for the expansion of
trade and economic relations, the same clause demands that
such trade and economic relations allow for "optimal use of the
world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development ... [and should seek to] protect and preserve the

environment."1 4 3 The United States called the Panel's interpretation a "one-sided view of the object and purpose of the WTO
Agreement" 144 and stated that the ruling should have been
overturned.
United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky
responded by declaring that the Panel's decision "does not affect

139. See id. %126-27.
140. Id. 28
141. See id. 16; see also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex II, art. 3, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter the DSU]. The DSU consists of twenty-seven articles and four appendixes. See id. The purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system is to confer
predictability and security of outcome upon an international legal system that
is lacking such attributes. See id. The DSU established a judicial-type settlement system, in contrast to the earlier, less binding system under the GATT.
See id.
142. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, 16.
143. Id.
17 (quoting the WTO Agreement).
144. Id.

1999]

TuE MURKY WATERS

363

[the United States'] efforts to protect the sea turtles." 14 5 She
further averred that "the WTO Panel reached the wrong decision. ' 146 Barshefsky noted that the decision was
narrowly cast, focusing on one aspect of the United States law that
conditions shrimp imports on the adoption by the exporting nation of a
specific sea turtle conservation policy ....

The United States is com-

mitted to the protection of the environment and, in particular, protection of endangered species [and] will continue to play a leadership role
conservation measures to protect endanin promoting international
14 7
gered sea turtles.

In response to the Appellate Body decision, Barshefsky stated
that "[tihe Appellate Body has rightly recognized that our
shrimp-turtle law is an important and legitimate conservation

measure and not protectionist.' 48 "The Appellate Body Report,"
said Barshefsky, "does not suggest we weaken our environmental laws in any respect, and we do not intend to do so.... We will
our firm obevaluate our options in light of what best achieves
49
turtles.'
sea
endangered
protecting
of
jective
On November 25, 1998, the United States informed the
WTO that it intended to comply with the recent ruling, but it did
not give any specific details as to when and how it would come
into compliance.' 50 The United States reiterated that the decision did not suggest that the United States weaken its environmental laws and actually welcomed the portion of the ruling
that declared the environmental purpose of the restriction
legitimate. 151
C.

THE POSITION OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS

Non-governmental organizations and other influential international organizations backed the United States and voiced
their opposition to both the Panel and the Appellate Body Reports. The National Wildlife Foundation ("NWF"), which actively campaigns to protect the endangered sea turtles,
145. WTO Shrimp-Turtle Ruling Will not Halt U.S. Protection Efforts Barshefsky Vows, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) available in Westlaw database BNAIED (Apr. 9, 1998).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Trade: WTO Upholds Ruling that U.S. Restrictions Linked to Sea Turtles Violate Trade Rules, supra note 12.
149. Id.
150. See Trade: U.S. Says it Will Comply with WTO Ruling on Shrimp-Turtle, but Fails to Say When, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) available in Westlaw
database BNA-IED (Dec. 1, 1998).
151. See id.
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responded to the ruling of the Dispute Panel by urging the Clinton administration to appeal, noting that the Panel's decision
undermined legitimate efforts to conserve wildlife. 152 In its
analysis, the NWF argued that "[s]hrimping without the use of
TEDs causes more sea turtle deaths than all other human
causes combined."1 5 3 The NWF also asserted that the decision
declared that "trade trumps wildlife conservation" 154 and argued that trade rules need to recognize the legitimacy of environmental considerations. Finally, the NWF commented that
the international judicial process needs to reflect "the demo15 5
cratic principles of due process."
In an amicus curiae brief submitted to the WTO Panel, the
World Wildlife Foundation (the Foundation) argued that the
WTO would be strongly criticized if it continued to ignore important environmental concerns. 156 The Foundation declared that
by failing to consider environmental interests in the Panel rulings, the WTO undermined multilateral environmental agreements. 15 7 The Foundation also called the decision a "blow
against endangered sea turtles" and asserted that the WTO had
"elevated concerns for market access over concerns for critically
endangered species and the environment." 5 8 "[The WTO] has

relied on a contorted and dangerous interpretation of WTO
rules-ignoring language that plainly allows non-projectionist
limits on international commercial activity when necessary to
protect the environment. " 159
Charles Arden-Clarke, head of the trade and investment
unit at the Worldwide Fund for Nature International (WWF),
commented that despite some positive aspects of the Appellate
Body ruling, the decision "still prevents countries from taking
unilateral action on the global commons when irreversible environmental damage takes place."' 60 He concluded that "[i]t will
152. See National Wildlife Federation, Breaking News: WTO FurtherEndangers Sea Turtles <http:l/ww.nwf.org/nwf/international/trade/turtles/
analysis.html>.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Shrimp: WTO's Review of Dispute Panel's Ruling on U.S. Ban on
Shrimp Imports Completed, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) available in Westlaw
database BNA-BTD (Aug. 21, 1998).
157. See id.
158. Trade: WTO Shrimp-Turtle Ruling Will Not Halt U.S. Protection Efforts, Barshefsky Vows, supra note 145.
159. Id.
160. Trade: WTO Upholds Ruling that U.S. RestrictionsLinked to Sea Turtles Violate Trade Rules, supra note 12.
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be virtually impossible for any country to comply with these
[rulings].... If they [the WTO Panel and Appellate Body] don't
allow it in this case, where the measure in question is clearly not
protectionist and where the protection of sea turtles is covered
under international agreements, when are they ever going to allow it?"161 While the Appellate Body "moved some way to recog-

nizing environmental concerns," the WWF noted that it also
erected a "new and demanding set of tests" regarding the use of
trade measures for environmental purposes. 16 2 Similarly, Stewart Elgie, an attorney with the Sierra Legal Defense Fund,
opined that the GATT and WTO are "willfully blind" in ignoring
serious environmental issues. 16 3 The Center for International
Environmental Law, in conjunction with the Center for Marine
Conservation, Defenders of Wildlife, and the NWF, stated that
the ruling "exposes the failure of current international trade
rules to adequately balance trade and environmental
164
priorities."
D.

THE DECISION AND POSITION OF THE WTO

1.

WTO Dispute Panel Decision
The WTO Dispute Panel found the ban inconsistent with

Article XI: 1165 and unjustifiable under Article XX. 166 The Panel

also found that the "[e]nvironmental issues should be resolved
1 67
by international agreements, not by unilateral sanctions.
The Panel concluded "that the issue [in dispute] was not the urgency of protecting sea turtles" but whether countries adopting
do so consistently
and implementing environmental protections 168
with the GATT/WTO policies and provisions.
In deciding that the exceptions set forth in Article XX do not
apply to Section 609, the Panel focused on the chapeau. The
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Treaties: Product Process Actions Taken by U.S. Pose Threat to
Trading System, Lawyer Says, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) available in Westlaw
database BNA-BDT (Sept. 24, 1998).
164. Trade: WTO Shrimp-Turtle Ruling Will Not Halt U.S. Protection Efforts, Barshefsky Vows, supra note 145.
165. Having deciding that Article XI was violated, the Panel did not address
the challenging countries' arguments that Section 609 violated Articles I and
XII. See Panel Report, supra note 2, 8.1.
166. See id. [ 7.17; see also John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, WTO Circulates DisputeSettlement Report in Shrimp/Turtle Case, FindingU.S. Violations
of GATT, 4 INT'L L. UPDATE 74, 74 (June 1998).
167. Schmertz & Meier, supra note 166.
168. Id.
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specific language cited by the Panel stipulates that no trade
measure may "constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.' 6 9
The Panel held that because the TED requirement aids protection of endangered species, it is not "arbitrary." However, the
of
Panel found the TED restriction "unjustifiable" for purposes 170
the preamble in light of the free-trade focus of GATT/WTO.
The Panel noted that the GATT/WTO regime focuses on the facilitation of trade and liberalization of market access.17' In light
of this trade liberalizing objective, the Panel interpreted the
chapeau to allow members to deviate from GATT provisions only
if they do not undermine multilateral trading objectives, despite
the exceptions noted in Article XX. 1 72 Because the TED restric-

tion constituted a unilateral restriction on international trade
and an unjustifiable discrimination between countries, 7 3 the
Panel deemed it outside the scope of Article XX and a violation
174
of GATT.
Feeling pressure from the United States, Canada, and international environmental groups, the WTO Director-General
Renato Ruggiero noted that the WTO "should not be asked to act
as the 'judge, jury and police' of global environmental and ethical values.'u 75 He added that "[a]sking the WTO to solve issues
which are not central to its work-especially when these are issues which governments have failed to address satisfactorily in
other context-is not just a recipe for failure. It could do untold
harm to the trading system itself.' 7 6 Other trade experts, in169.

Panel Report, supra note 2,

170.

Id.

171.
172.

See id.
See id.

7.25.

7.49.
7.44.
7.44-7.49.

173. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. Although the Panel did
not find the issue dispositive, it did comment that lack of adequate negotiations
with other member countries is inherent in unilateral measures and, as such,
are contrary to the multilateral trading system. See also Panel Report, supra
7.55 (stating that "[t]he negotiation of a multilateral agreement or
note 2,
action under multilaterally defined criteria is clearly a possible way to avoid
threatening the multilateral trading system.")
174. See id. 7.62. The Panel, finding that Section 609 was stopped at the
gates of the chapeau, did not consider whether Section 609 would meet the
scope and requirements of Article XX(b) or (g). See id.
175. Trade: WTO Cannot Be "Judge,Jury, Police" of Environmental Issues,
Ruggiero Says, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) available in Westlaw database BNABTD (Mar. 18, 1998).
176. Trade: WTO Shrimp-Turtle Ruling Will Not Halt U.S. Protection Efforts, Barshefsky Vows, supra note 145; see also Trade: WTO Cannot Be "Judge,
Jury, Police" of Environmental Issues, Ruggiero Says, supra note 175.
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cluding former WTO Dispute Panel members, agree that the decision exemplifies the inability of the WTO to deal with
complicated issues which intermingle environmental and international trade policies. 17 7 Experts also note that the WTO is increasingly faced with the tendency of countries to bring before it
disputes on issues that 1those
countries failed to address in ear78
lier negotiating rounds.
2.

Holding of the Appellate Body

The Appellate Body upheld the Dispute Panel ruling on different grounds, but it overturned several key considerations of
the Panel. 179 The Appellate Body found the Panel's conclusion
flawed, largely "from the fact that the Panel disregarded the sequence of steps essential for carrying out" a proper analysis
under Article XX.

8 0°

A proper analysis, according the Appellate

Body, requires examining the measure under the general exceptions allowed by Article XX and then, if qualifying, appraising
18
its application under the chapeau of Article XX.

The Appellate Body also ruled that the Panel failed to apply
"the customary rules of interpretation of public international
law" as required by the DSU.1 8 2 The Appellate Body disagreed
with the Panel's analysis because the Panel "looked into the object and purpose of the whole of GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement" rather than "the object and purpose of the chapeau of
Article XX" alone.18 3 By doing this, the Panel reached an overly
177. See Trade: WTO Cannot Be "Judge,Jury, Police" of Environmental Issues, Ruggiero Says, supra note 175. One notable trade expert speaking out
about the inadequacies of the WTO was Thomas Cottier, a professor of law at
the University of Bern, Switzerland. Professor Cottier has served on several
former WTO Dispute Panels.
178. See id.
179. See Trade: WTO Upholds Ruling that U.S. Restrictions Linked to Sea
Turtles Violate Trade Rules, supra note 12.
180. Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, 117.
181. See id. para. 118.
182. Id. T 114. The Appellate Body noted that the DSU rules call for an
examination of the "ordinary meaning of the words of a treaty, read in their
context, and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty involved." Id. The
Appellate Body held that the Panel disregarded the U.S. Gasoline instructions
that the chapeau of Article XX "by its express terms addresses, not so much the
questioned measure or its specific contents as such, but rather the manner in
which that measure is applied." Id. 1 115 (citation omitted). See also supra note
141 and accompanying text (defining and explaining the DSU system).
183. Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, 116.
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broad formulation of the chapeau, thus creating "a broad standard and a test" not within the text of Article XX.184
Having reversed the Panel's analysis and conclusion regarding Section 609 under the chapeau of Article XX, the Appellate
Body continued where the Panel left off.18 5 The Appellate Body

noted that the United States' primary claim was that Section
609 qualified under Article XX(g). The first level of analysis,
then, must ask whether the measure concerns conservation of
"exhaustible natural resources." 18 6 Rejecting the challenging
countries' argument that Article XX(g) covers only mineral and
non-living resources and construing the term "natural resources" more broadly, the Appellate Body determined that the
exhaustibility of the species combined with their migratory patqualified sea turtles
terns and status as an endangered species
18 7
as an "exhaustible natural resource.

The Appellate Body also determined that there must be a
reasonable relationship between a measure's purported purpose
of conserving exhaustible natural resources and the means applied in effectuating that purpose.18 8 The Appellate Body determined that Section 609 and its implementing regulations were
directly connected with their purpose of conserving sea turtles.18 9 Section 609 therefore related to the conservation of an
exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of Article
XX(g). 9 0° Having thus decided that Article XX(g) provided a justification for Section 609, the Appellate Body found it unnecessary to analyze the measure in terms of Article XX(b). 19 1 The
Appellate Body then noted that even if Section 609 fell under
subsection (b) or (g), it must also satisfy the requirements of the
introductory clauses in the chapeau of Article XX. 19 2 The Appel-

late Body rejected the United States' argument that if a policy
measure falls within the terms of Article XX (b) or (g), then the
116-122. See also Trade: WTO UpholdsRuling that U.S. Restric184. Id.
tions Linked to Sea Turtles Violate Trade Rules, supra note 12.
185. The Appellate Body stated that Article 17 of DSU grants the Panel jurisdiction to make a finding on a legal issue which was not addressed by the
Panel. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, [ 123.
126.
186. Id.
128-134.
187. Id.
188. See id. [ 137, 141.
189. See id. [ 141-142
190. See id.
191. See id. [ 146. The Appellate Body noted that the United States, in its
appeal, invokes Article XX(b) only if and to the extent that Section 609 falls
outside the scope of Article XX(g).
147.
192. See id.
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measure 1 9necessarily
complies with the requirements of the
3
chapeau.

The Appellate Body concentrated on the three standards
contained in the chapeau that, if met, would cause a measure to
fail. First, the measure must result in discrimination.1 94 Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in
character. 195 Third, the discrimination must occur between
countries where the same conditions prevail.19 6 Applying these
standards, the Appellate Body held that Section 609 constituted
unjustifiable discrimination because the application of the measure, through the implementation of the 1996 Guidelines and
the regulatory practice of the administrators, required that
WTO Members adopt regulatory programs not only comparable
to but essentially the same as those applied by United States vessels. 197 The Appellate Body reasoned that if Section 609 required countries to apply "essentially the same" standard as
that applied to United States vessels, then the measure constituted "a rigid and unbending standard by which the United
States officials determine whether or not countries will be certified."' 9 8 Because Section 609 did not take into consideration
conditions unique to each member's territory, the measure promoted the differential treatment of countries desiring certification.' 9 9 The Appellate Body also ruled that the United States
had exerted different levels of effort in helping countries come
20 0
into compliance with the required TED technology.
The Appellate Body then questioned whether 609 had been
applied in a manner constituting "arbitrary discrimination."
The Appellate Body stated that "[tihere appears to be no way
that exporting Members can be certain whether the terms of
Section 609, in particular, the 1996 Guidelines, are being applied in a fair and just manner by the appropriate governmental
agencies of the United States."2 0 1 Because the application of
193. See id. 149.
194. See id. 150.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id. 163.
198. Id.
199. See id. 164. The Appellate Body also noted that the United States
had negotiated with certain countries more than others. See id.
172. Thus,
the Appellate seemed to hint that the lack of uniform negotiations prior to im-

plementing Section 609 contributed to the determination that Section 609 was
discriminatory. See id. 172.
200. See id. 175.
201. Id. 181.
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Section 609 constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination, it was contrary to the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.20 2 Finding Section 609 contrary to the chapeau, despite

the determination that Article XX(g) was applicable, the Appellate Body ruled that Section 609 does not qualify
for exemption
20 3
under any of the subsections of Article XX.

Recognizing the political sensitivity and past turbulence of
trade-environment issues, the Appellate Body publicly noted
their concern for environmental policies:
We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the environment is of no significance to the Members of the WTO. Clearly it is.
We have not decided that the sovereign nations that are Members of
the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And we have
not decided that sovereign states should not act together bilaterally,
plurilaterally or multilaterally, either within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect endangered species 2or
to otherwise protect
04
the environment. Clearly, they should and do.

The Appellate Body deemed Members free to adopt their own
environmental policies "aimed at protecting the environment as
long as, in so doing, they fulfill their obligations and respect the
rights of other Members under the WTO Agreement.'2 °5
For the above reasons, the Appellate Body reversed the
Panel's finding that Section 609 was not within Article XX's exceptions. Section 609, while justified under Article XX(g), failed
to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. In its
recommendations, the Appellate Body suggested that the United
States bring Section 609 into conformity with the obligations of
20 6
the United States under the WTO Agreement.
III.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DISPUTE PANEL AND
WTO APPELLATE BODY HOLDINGS

The Dispute Panel and Appellate Body reports contain significant problems. Each bends the text of GATT in order to find
extraterritorial unilateral regulations per se invalid because
they run contrary to the WTO's overriding policy to facilitate
trade internationally. Both reports are thus consistent with the
WTO's unfortunate tendency to compromise environmental issues for the sake of increased trade levels.
202.
203.

See id.
See id.

204.

Id.

205.
206.

Id.
186.
See id.
187-188.

186.

185.
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DISPUTE PANEL HOLDING

The Dispute Panel ruling attempts to fashion a new test applicable to unilateral but not multilateral environmental trade
measures despite the developments advanced by Tuna/Dolphin
I, Tuna/Dolphin II, and U.S. Gasoline. The Panel found that
Section 609 violated Article XI:I of GATT because it created a
restriction on trade. 20 7 Assuming arguendo that Section 609 violated Article XI:1 2° 8 (or, for that matter, any provision in Articles I or XIII), the only real issue lies in whether the United
States may justify its action under an Article XX exception. If
applicable, an Article XX exception renders moot any discussions regarding the Article III "process/production" distinction.20 9 It also makes any analysis under Article XIII's
prohibition of "differential treatment of like products" non-dispositive. 2 10 Simply stated, if the United States can justify its
actions under either Article XX(b) or XX(g), regardless of other
GATT violations, Section 609 should be upheld.
The Panel, however, found a way to avoid directly addressing whether Section 609 met the elements of Article XX(b) or (g).
The Panel looked exclusively to the chapeau, but concluded that
the chapeau's "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" clause
was silent as to whether Section 609 was within Article XX's
scope. For guidance in interpreting the chapeau, the Panel
looked to GATT's broad purposes of opening international market access and promoting free trade. 2 1 1 With these purposes in
mind, the Panel decided that the correct interpretation of the
chapeau only allows Article XX exceptions if members "do not
undermine the WTO multilateral trading system." 2 12 The
Panel, under this new interpretation, ruled that Section 609
threatened to undermine the multilateral trading system and
21 3
therefore fell outside the scope of the chapeau.
The Panel, in creating this new standard for trade-environment disputes under the chapeau, stripped the authority for environmental protection granted to individual nations by Article
7.17.
207. See Panel Report, supra note 2,
208. It is important to mention that there are arguments beyond the scope
of this Note stating that the "product-production" distinction followed by the
Panel and similar to that of the Tuna /Dolphin decisions may in itself have interpretive flaws.
209. See supra note 63.
210. See supra notes 102 and 106 and accompanying text.
211. See Panel Report, supra note 2,
7.43.
212. Id.
7.44, 7.45.
213. See id.
7.61.
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XX. The very nature of an exception allows something that
would not normally qualify under the general requirements to
be justified in a particular situation. The Panel's interpretation
of the chapeau raises the bar to a seemingly unattainable level.
Any measure creating a prohibition or restriction on trade may
violate Article XI; yet, at the same time, all unilateral measures
can be seen as a threat to the multilateral trading system and
therefore fall outside the scope of the exceptions. Under this
new standard, then, no unilateral environmental measure
sustained. 2 14 The examounting to a restriction on trade can be
2 15
apply.
ceptions in Article XX may never
The Panel realized that, after the Tuna/Dolphin and U.S.
Gasoline decisions, the WTO had already conceded that extraterritorial environmental trade measures were permissible and
that the Article XX exceptions encompassed the protection of endangered species. The Panel had to find other means to dismantle the United States' shrimp embargo, and it therefore blue
penciled its own interpretation into GATT categorically prohibiting any unilateral measure with a negative impact on the flow of
trade. 2 16 This interpretation lacks basis in the text of Article
XX. 21 7 Article XX carefully carves out several exception, recog-

nizing that in certain circumstances a unilateral measure may
be justified to protect an important environmental resource despite the measure's effect on trade. 21 8 Article XX(b) provides an
exception for measures, whether unilateral or multilateral, "nec21 9
essary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" ; Article XX(g) provides the same exception for measures "relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources." The Panel's
reading would render unilateral measures per se invalid regardless of the statutory exceptions.
The Panel relied too much on the object and purpose of
GATT for clarification of Article XX. Looking outside the text of
Article XX to such a broad standard runs contrary to the inter214.

See generally Appellate Body Report, supra note 6,

122.

215. See id. J 121 noting that "[s]uch an interpretation renders most, if not
all, of the specific exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the
principles of interpretation we are bound to apply."
216. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
217. See id. Nowhere in the text of either the chapeau or the exceptions
themselves does Article XX exclude unilaterally enacted environmental
regulations.
218. See id.
219. See supra note 65.
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pretive rules of international public law. 220 Even so, while eluci-

dating the meaning of the chapeau, the Panel ignored the
acknowledgement of environmental purposes in the preamble to
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 2 2 1 The Agreement's preamble states that international
trade should be viewed "with the objective of sustainable development .

.

.

and should protect and preserve the environ-

ment."2 22 Asserting that GATT/WTO merely facilitates trade
without deference to the environment, the Panel misinterprets
Article XX and renders the provisions of Article XX(b) and (g)
22 3
toothless.
The Panel compounded its flawed analysis by finding it unnecessary to analyze whether Section 609 met the requirements
of Article XX(b) and (g). The Panel avoided this inquiry by relying completely on the interpretation of the chapeau it had pulled
from the air. This left member countries with no precedent to
help them determine whether and how unilateral environmental
regulations protecting endangered species could be enforced.
The Panel's holding thus illustrates the WTO's tendency to
favor trade at the expense of needed international environmental regulations. Section 609 presented a compelling case for reversing this tradition and upholding a carefully drafted and
necessary environmental measure. Based on the facts of the
Shrimp / Turtle dispute and on the text of Article XX, the Panel
should have found in favor of the United States regulation. In
failing to do so, the Panel effectively dismissed one of GATT's
most important environmental protection provisions.
B.

APPELLATE BODY HOLDING

Although affirming the result, the Appellate Body reversed
the Panel's analysis of the Article XX chapeau. The Appellate
Body went to great lengths in an effort to remedy the flaws of
the Panel's decision, yet still avoided approving the United
220. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, 114. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties instructs that a treaty should be interpreted in ac-

cordance with its ordinary meaning in light of its object and purpose and that
[o]ne of the corollaries of the "general rule of interpretation" in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to
all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading
that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty
to redundancy or inutility.
U.S. Gasoline, supra note 80, at 627.
221. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, 12.
222. Id.
114, 121.
223. See id.
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States' attempt to follow the map drawn by the Tuna/Dolphin
and U.S. Gasoline cases. The Appellate Body found that the
Panel erred in failing to analyze Article XX(b) and (g). More important, the Appellate Body specifically held that Article XX(g)
applied to Section 609 because sea turtles were an "exhaustible
natural resource" and that Section 609 constituted a measure
"relating to" the conservation of a natural resource. 22 4 The Appellate Body appropriately criticized the Panel's reasoning that
unilateral measures inherently threaten the multilateral trading system. 225 The Appellate Body failed, however, in its application of the chapeau of Article XX.
Like the Panel, the Appellate Body began its analysis
trumpeting the "customary rules of interpretation of public international law"2 26 and the application of "the ordinary meaning

of the words... read in the light of the object and purpose of the
treaty involved." 227 Yet after advocating a textual reading of Article XX, the Appellate Body refocused on the chapeau of Article
XX and deemed Section 609 invalid under GATT. Beginning
with the chapeau language, "such measures are not to be applied in a manner which would constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail [or] a disguised restriction on international
trade,"228 the Appellate Body crafted a balancing test "between
the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX
and the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of
other Members." 229 The Appellate Body held that the language
"makes clear" that the Article XX exceptions have limits and
conditions. 2 30 In explaining those limits and conditions, the Appellate Body removed its "textualist" hat and looked to the negotiating history of GATT for support. 23 1 The Appellate Body
made a substantial interpretive leap in its construction of the
chapeau's language excluding arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination, whittling a high standard down to a mere balancing
test of rights.
224. Id. 9T 134, 142-144.
225.

See id. T 115 and accompanying notes.

226. Id. 114.
227. Id.
228. Id. 156.
229. Id.
230. Id. 157.
231. The Appellate Body invoked Article 32 of the Vienna Convention to allow itself "supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work." Id. T 157 n.152.
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The Appellate Body, like the Panel, used the chapeau as a
way out of upholding Section 609. Under its newly conceived
test, the Appellate Body found the United States requirements
arbitrary and unjustifiable because the 1996 Guidelines mandated that WTO members adopt programs not only comparable
to but "essentially the same as" those applied to United States
vessels. 23 2 The Body held that the 1996 Guidelines established
"a rigid and unbending standard by which the United States offi23 3
cials determine whether or not countries will be certified.
Relying on this analysis, the Appellate Body found Section 609
outside the scope of Article XX.
Although strong, the Appellate Body's argument is rebuttable. The 1996 Guidelines specifically provide that shrimping operations "comparable" to those of the United States may be
certified. 2 34 The Appellate Body adduces no support for its assertion that the United States requires foreign shrimping policies to be "essentially the same" as those of the United States.
Additionally, Section 609 treated all countries posing the same
threat to sea turtles similarly with relation to each other and to
the United States. 23 5 The 1996 Guidelines provided several
other mechanisms for the State Department to certify a nation
populations or which harin areas without significant sea turtle
2 36
vest shrimp from shrimp farms.
Finally, the Appellate Body found the United States' failure
to seek multilateral solutions an important factor in determining Section 609 unjustifiably discriminatory. 2 37 This finding ignores two important points. First, nothing in Article XX
requires multilateral efforts. 2 38 Second, stating a preference for
232. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
233. Id.
234. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
235. See Appellate Body Report supra note 6, 20. Additionally, the Appellate Body found that a factor in determining that Section 609 constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" was that the United States did not try to reach a
multilateral agreement. Id. H 171-173. However, by simply stating that a
multilateral agreement is preferable, the Appellate Body provides no guidance
as to how a unilateralenvironmental trade measure could be drafted in order to
satisfy GATT/WTO scrutiny. This may provide further evidence that the WTO,
while claiming that some unilateral measures could qualify under Article XX,
has created an insurmountable hurdle for unilateral environmental measures.
236. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text; see also supra note 52
and accompanying text (noting the limited difference in the actual application
of unilateral and multilateral agreements).
238. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. It is also important to
note that the Appellate Body, in discussing the alleged lack of adequate multi-
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multilateral agreements provides no guidance as to how a unilateral environmental trade measure could be drafted in order to
satisfy GATT/WTO scrutiny. The Appellate Body's reasoning
provides further evidence that the WTO, while claiming that
some unilateral measures could qualify under Article XX, creates an insurmountable hurdle for unilateral environmental
measures. Section 609's narrowly tailored requirements and
careful implementation did not rise to the level of "unjustifiable
discrimination" or "disguised restrictions on international trade"
under the chapeau. Therefore, after appearing to correct the interpretive error of the Panel, the Appellate Body changed the
standard of analysis of the chapeau to reach the same ultimate
conclusion.
The Appellate Body, after bending over backwards to ensure that the WTO would not automatically strike unilateral
measures, essentially demonstrated that although environmental measures are recognized as legitimate under Article XX(g),
unilateral environmental measures will constitute "arbitrary
and unjustifiable discrimination" and will fail the Article XX
chapeau analysis. By doing so, the Appellate Body raised the
standard of review of the chapeau and closed the door on member countries' abilities to initiate much needed extraterritorial
environmental measures.
The Report of the Appellate Body, unfortunately, leaves the
United States few alternatives. One alternative would be for
Congress to redraft Section 609 so that the measure complies
with GATT. As this Note argues, however, Section 609 in its
unilateral form is unlikely to clear the new bar set by the
WTO. 2 3 9 Another option would be for the United States to ig-

nore the WTO altogether and continue to implement Section
609. Yet the United States has already indicated that it will not
do so. 240 The only viable option under the Appellate Body's rul-

ing is for the United States to abandon unilateral measures altogether and attempt a multilateral global environmental
agreement even though multilateral agreements can be much
lateral negations, cited several other international treaties and conventions for

the proposition that multilateral negotiations are preferred, but pointed to no
language in Article XX or GATT requiring such negations prior to initiating a
unilateral measure. See Appellate Report, supra note 6,
166-172.
239. See Cadeddu, supra note 22, at 202-03.
240. See Trade: U.S. Says it Will Comply with WTO Ruling on Shrimp-Turtle, but Failsto Say When, supra note 150; see also Cadeddu, supra note 22, at
203 (stating that the United States would face serious consequences if it ignored the WTO's decision).
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harder to create and often are much less effective than unilateral measures. 24 1 Although GATT favors multilateral agreements, the text does not say that unilateral trade measures are
per se invalid. The WTO, unfortunately, refuses to clarify exactly how the United States could create needed unilateral environmental trade measures in compliance with current GATT
analysis.
The United States is thus left in a precarious position. In
creating a new standard for analyzing unilateral extraterritorial
environmental trade measures, the Appellate Body muddied the
waters with flawed legal reasoning, arriving at what appears to
have been the predetermined destination of invalidating Section
609. Meanwhile, the sea turtle remains unprotected.
C.

THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS A NEUTRAL DECISION-

MAKER?

Many question the ability of the WTO to preside effectively
as a "court" over international environmental issues. When created, the WTO replaced GATT's consensual dispute resolution
24 2
procedures with a system of binding dispute resolution.
GATT's initial enactment provided post-World War II trade-facilitating rules; as international law developed, GATT became
responsible for governing nearly all trade-related disputes on
the international front. 24 3 As environmental awareness grew
and it became clear that environmental needs do not bend nicely
within territorial boundaries, environmental legislation and
trade regulation collided. This development left a dispute resolution body with a trade-promoting purpose to settle these disputes. Not surprisingly, the WTO often leans too heavily on its
initial trade-protecting purpose, and it sometimes seems incapable of acting as a neutral decision-maker. Many have criticized
the Shrimp / Turtle ruling for being completely one-sided: "It declares that trade trumps wildlife conservation, not just in efforts
2 44
to conserve endangered sea turtles, but for all similar efforts."
241. Because this Note addresses the analysis of unilateral measures under
GATT, a discussion of the effectiveness of multilateral agreements is beyond its
scope. However, several commentators have discussed the pros and cons of
such agreements at great length. For good discussions regarding the effectiveness and legitimacy of unilateral versus multilateral trade agreements, see de
Fontaubert, supra note 13; Foster, supra note 51, and Strauss, supra note 54.
242. See McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 41.
243. See Strauss, supra note 54, at 776-78.
244. See National Wildlife Federation, supra note 152.
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The complaints that followed the Shrimp/Turtle decision mirrored those in response to Tuna/Dolphin I and I.
The WTO/GATT regime has interpreted Article XX(g) of
GATT to include dolphins, clean air, and shrimp as exhaustible
natural resources for the purposes of the exception. 245 The
WTO/GATT Panels and Appellate Bodies have overcome their
previous misinterpretation that GATT Article XX applies only6
24
within the territory of the country promulgating the measure.
The Shrimp/ Turtle Appellate Body initially seemed to build on
prior decisions and to continue liberalizing the interpretation of
Article XX exceptions by stating that the chapeau does not categorically exclude unilateral trade measures as long as they are
applied in a non-discriminatory way. 24 7 The Appellate Body,

however, in determining the meaning of "non-discriminatory,"
followed its instinct to promote trade. 248 After beginning in the
right direction, the Appellate Body changed course and put forth
a self-cancelling interpretation or standard to guide international environmental programs.
The WTO could effectively act as a neutral decision-making
body, however. The Shrimp/Turtle dispute presented a very
compelling case for the WTO to approve of a unilateral, extraterritorial measure that protects the global environment. Although
GATT policies protect trade, the preamble to the agreement that
established the WTO explicitly recognizes that protection of
trade should not completely override principles of sustainable
development and environmental protection. 24 9 The WTO could
have decided for the United States, consistent with GATT provisions and policy, and could have done so without dismantling
any of its previous decisions. If Article XX justifies the measure,
analyses of whether and how the United States violated GATT
Articles I, III, XI or XIII become irrelevant.
The Article XX exceptions in GATT allow for the protection
of endangered species as long as the measure protecting them is
necessary and related to that purpose. 25 0 No previous GATT/
WTO ruling has held unilateral environmental measures per se
245. See supra Section I (discussing the holdings of Tuna/Dolphin II, U.S.
Gasoline and Shrimp / Turtle).
246. See supra notes 73 through 76 and accompanying text (discussing the
Tuna/Dolphin H ruling).
247. See supra notes 192 through 192 and accompanying text (discussing
the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body's analysis of the chapeau).
248. Id.
249. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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invalid. The chapeau could and should have been read to prevent only the use of these Article XX exceptions upon a showing
of a measure's egregious discriminatory effect or disguised discriminatory intent. 2 5 1 There was no showing of either in the
Shrimp/Turtle dispute. Although Section 609 violated other articles of GATT, it could easily have been justified under Article
XX. Such an interpretation would maintain a high level of scrutiny for measures affecting trade, yet recognize that some such
measures constitute necessary means to protect the
environment.
By simply following the guidance set forth in GATT itself,
even acknowledging that GATT is a trade-protective agreement,
the WTO could have effectively acted as a neutral decisionmaker and found in this specific case that the unilateral measure was justified. Unfortunately, through the development of
previous environment-trade disputes, the WTO instead demonstrated that it may not be competent to act as a neutral adjudicative body capable of reaching well-reasoned, equitable
decisions in environment-trade disputes.
CONCLUSION
The Shrimp /Turtle ruling failed to clarify how a GATTmember country may act unilaterally to protect an endangered
species such as the sea turtle. Unilateral trade restrictions
seem to provide a much more effective method of enforcing environmental protection than multilateral agreements, but unilateral restrictions may achieve their results at the expense of free
trade and carry a potential for abuse. Apparently, the WTO will
continue to find ways to strike down unilateral measures. This
practice, without more candid and clearer reasoning that countries may follow, may in time hurt or even destroy its credibility
as a dispute resolution mechanism. Unfortunately, due to the
WTO's textual acrobatics in interpreting Article XX and its professed intention to analyze issues case-by-case, countries wishing to help sea turtles survive have no guidance and can only
proceed with the hope that their protective measure is not
brought before the WTO.

251.

See id.

